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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern banking in China has a his.tory of about fifty. year~> 
During these fifty .years, modern banks have playe d an incre.as-
ing l y important role in the Chines e economy. It was made 
ev ident by t he gradual l i quida tion .ot: t he old-fashioned f .inan-
c ial i nst i tutions and the wi -thdrawa l of forei gn banks f rom the .. 
predominant po.sition . However , the Chin ese modern banks have . 
f aile d to deve lop t he way .to ma r:>. t .. t he ne eds of other econ omic. 
activities in ,the. country • 
. China is basically a rural c ountry with slow progress in 
industrial d.evelopment. '!'here are two problems f a cing the 
economi c. recons truction of China , namely, the rehabilitation 
of rural .economy and t h e industrialization of the nation. The 
rehabil:Lta t.ion o.f rural .economy i nvolves the supply of .capi ta.l 
funds for investing in . permanent rural impr.ov.ernents and the 
industrialization involves t he supply of capital funds for. 
invtst ing in capital equlpment.s; both of these n e ed l a r g.e-. scal-e 
long-term credit. Apparently , modern Chinese banks were not 
developing .toward the. way to solve these problems; they have 
developed in ways of their. own .• 
The fundamental .cause .fo.r .. the di.screpancy lie'i in the in-
herent weakness in the character of the modern banking system. 
Almost f r om the very inception, mod 0rn banks have centered .thelfr 
, activities more in financing of Government than in serving the 
i 
~eeds of trade and industry . The rapid growth and prosperity 
~ of modern banks in the 1 920's was c ontra ry to the economic 
1 c onditions at that time. The Chinese banking system was 
I character 5zed by the dominonce of current liabilities and the 
lack of adequa te rediscount facilit'les, hence bankers wore i 
I 
I 
unable to provide a large amount of long-term credit to satisfy l1 
the demands of industry and agriculture. As a consequence, II 
I 
modern banks clustered in a few important cities dealing 
chi e fly in short-terM commercia l loans and speculat i v e 
activities . 
The Currency !1 eform o.f Novembe't" 1 S1~5 led to the unifies-
tion of cuDrency , centralization of issue and direct govern-
ment control over the Government banks . Under the imp~ct of 
Sino-Japanese hostilities , the National Government seized the 
opportunity to strengthen the position of the Central Bank of 
China and to expand the actlv1 t ies of Government banks . 
Speciali zed functions assigned for the four Government banks 
ha v e not performed effectively . Despite their rapid rat e of 
controlled enterprises, the efficiency of whi ch was entirely 
doubtful. ~I>ivate industrial conc e :r-ns , small merche.nts and 
farmers found difficulty in obtaining sufficient f 1nance from 
the banks . As a result, it offered a timely encouragement to 
t he active :indiv i dual money l enders and "under - ground" bankers . 
Sho ~c>tly a . .fter t he long , exhausting elght-year resistance 
agai.nst the Ja.panese invasion, the civil strife between the 
Natjonalists and the communists commenced to flame in 1946. 
Inflation of currency entered an advanced stage. which brought 
about economi c instabili.ty and social unrest all over the 
!I 
I 
/ count r y . The postwar reconstruction program had been put aside 1 
end the -financial resources were devoted to supporting the 
military expenditures. Serious inflation having impaired the 
banking resources, bankers , in the hazardous position , were 
thus impelled to maintain their assets as .liquid as possible. 
F'urtbermore, the financ ia l pol1c1es and t e bank control 
measures of the National Government wer e subject to constant 
change and few of them have been enforced effectively. This 
has brought anot~er element to ths disorder of financial and 
eccnoruic conditions in China. 
I 
,I 
II 
I[ 
I 
In conclus l on, the Chinese bank :lng system during the. past 1 
fifty years ha s suffered from a lAck of co-ordinat ion between I' 
the modern money market and the various sectors of t e national 
e conomy due to the fact that t he former made great strides 
while the latter could hardly keep pace .with its pr.ogress . 
This study purports to. evaluate the relationship betwe en 
the Chinese modern banking system and the activities or the 
nat:i.onal economy and to oescribe t he. signi.f:lcance of its 
development on China 's peace and wa r economy . The problem is 
to be approached by tracing the formation of bank ing institu-
t i ons and deve lopments, by investigating the interna l organiza- l 
iii 
I 
I 
1 
tion and practices and by analyzing the influence of Government 
financial policies . It covers the period from the appearance 
of the first Chinese-owned modern bank in 1897 to the Ne'fi.T 
Monetar y Heform in 1948 . The meagernes s of da ta necess ar i l y 
renders t his. study far .f'rom .being compl ete ; the most si gnifi-
cant characteristics .of .the development, however , are to b e 
considered. 
I 
II 
I 
CHAPTER II 
EARLY HISTORY, 1887-1911 
THE DECLINE OF I NDIGENOUS_ CHINESE FINANC.IAL INSTIT.U'T'IO!- S 
I Before t he appearance of modern Chinese banks, t hree kinds 
I of indigenous old - fa s hioned Chinese financial lnstitutl.ons 
I 
existed , namely , the pawnshops , the piao-hao and the chien-
chuan or natlve banks . They reflect the agricultural and the 
1 commercial economy and t he monetary system in the different 
stages of Chinese economic hts tory. 
The existence of pawnshops . whi ch had once been the 
primary source of credit for fa r mers, was reported as early 
as Sung Dynasty (X century A. D. ) . In 1920 ' s they began to 
decline rapidly and their functions of credit received llttl.e 
attention from Chinese economists . 
The s erv i ce of remittances and drafts in China wa s 
introduced by Shansi merchants . The organization of piao- hao 
may be traced back to the eighteenth century. In 1880 there 
were 30 Shansi piao-hao ~i th 83 branches , existing in all 
i mportant trade centers of Chlna , includtng Manchur ia , Mongolia 
1 . Chen ~ Chi-Tien , A Brier History of Shansi Piao- Chuan , 
1 935 ~ p . 97- 98 . 
,, 
I 
I 
I 
remittances, .the~ operated with deposits and loans and took 
charge of the administrarion of the Imperial Treasury funds . 
The collapse of Shansi piao-hao came wi th fall of the Manchu 
Dyna sty. 
It was more than two hundred years ago that chien-chuan 
were cons tituted wi t h the money exchange as their primary 
fu.nct j on. During the end of the Manchu Dynasty , va.ry.ing 
weights and fineness of silver taels circulat ing in the market 
gave rise to the chien-chuan. As a r esult of. local needs 
these native f inancial institutions grew up in handling 
deposits, lending, remittances and issue of local yuan bills. 
They were· established in the f .orm of s.ingle proprietorshlp or 
partnership. They neither received support nor were subjected 
to supervision by the Government . Chien-chuan and their gilds 
were the central institutions of the native money market . 
The existence and prosperity of chi en-chuan were so intimately 
tied up with the economi c life of the nat:i.on that they at once 
r eflected general economic cond i tions throughout the country. 
'rhe Rubber Crisis and the Revolutlon of 1 911, t he great 
depression in 1933 and the abolition of silver tael in the 
Currency Reform of 1935 caused the general collapse of the ol d 
Chine s e f inancial institutions. Tho s e which were able to 
survive various crises were either reorganized themselv~s into 
modern banks or forced to adopt new methods of opera tion. 
THE RISE OF MODERN BANKS 
I 
I 
2 
I 
I 
II 
I Ever since the Opium War. of 18~9-1842, t he close door 
policy and the self-sufficient economy of China have been 
greatly disturbed . The opening of the five treaty ports in 
1842 led to free foreign intercourse . Western powers and Japan 
enjoyed their special privileges in China from repeated 
military and diplomatic losses by Manchu Government . Modern 
banks rose up durlng these great politlcal and economic change.s 
Although the e s t ablishment of the foreign bank in China, 
the British-chartered Orient.al .Banking Corporation, . . was as 
early as 1848 , the appearance of .. a Chinese-owned modern bank 
was not until 1897 when the Commercial Bank of Ch lna .was 
established . The Bank was organlzed by Sheng Hsuan-Huai, a 
prominent official and later to become Minister of Communica-
tions and Viceroy , with a capital of 5 million taels and with 
a view to developing China's fore:i.gn tra de . 
In 1904 .the . .Hu Pu (Board o.f Revenue) Bank was chartered 
as a central inst.itution under the control of Hu Pu . The. 
authorized capital of the Bank was 4 million taels, jointly 
subscribed by the Government .and by the public . The Bank was 
reorganized as the Ta Ching Bank in 1908 . After the Revo.luti.on 
of 1 911, it was again r eorganized and to be known as the Banl>: 
of China. 
In 1907 a second of.fic ial bank , the Bank o.f Communications . 
was chartered fro.m the pet:i.t i on of' t he Board of Posts and 
Communications with the aims of' uniting under one management 
steams hip lines, r ai lways, telegra ph and postal f acilities and 
of recovering certain profits. 
Between 1907 and 1908 three important private banks were 
organi zed: the Hsing Yeh Bank (later the National Commercial 
Bank) , the Chekiang Bank (later the Chekiang Industrial Bank) 
and the Nin·•po Commercial and Savings Bank . At the end of 1 910 
there were 8 modern banks existing with a total capital of 37 
1 
million ta.els . The Revolutlon of 1 911 brought about .i mportant 
changes in the development. of modern Chinese banks. 
The introduction of modern banks in China is the introduc-
tion of modern organiza tion andmodern methods of operation in 
ba nking business whi ch are quite different from that of the 
indigenous n.ative banks . But modern banks were meeting 
difficulties fr om t he slow development of the other parts of 
the economy and from the predominant influences of the native 
and foreign banks in the country . 
1. Banking Institutions i.n China , The Chinese Economi c 
Monthly, January 1926 , p . 21 . 
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CHAPTER 'I II 
BANK I NG DEVgLOPM'F!~NT AFTER 'T'HE REVOLUTION OF 1 '11, 
1 911 ... 1935 
Af t er the Revolution of 1 911, there. was little impr.ovemen.t I 
ln t he economic cond i tion in China. The extreme backwardnes.s .. 
in industry kept most parts of. the old country rema·· ning in 
t he stage of agricultural society~ Difficulties facing the 
development of modern banks wer.e :nanifold. Despite the 
unfavorable economic condition , modern banks grew up rapidly 
during the two decn.d<3s af ter the Revolu·t ion. Before analyzing 
the characteristics of their development , it is desirable to 
summarize briefly vari.ous groups of banking institutions de-
veloped since that time. 
The banking structure in China may be said to be for..med 
of three systems: the central, the local and the private.. he 
central system comprises the Central Bank of China., the Bank of 
China , the Bank of Communications., the Farmers Bank .of China , . 
the Central Trust of China and the .Postal Savings and Remit-
tances Bank. The local system comprise s all provincial and 
municipal banks and later hs ien .banks . 'rhe private system 
comprise s all commercial be.nks . 
Th'"E .c gNTRAL BANKING SYSTEM 
The First Central Bank of China 
The first Central Bank of China wa s established on August 
15, 1924 in Canton by the National Government. Its c apital 
was fixed at 10 million local yuan in silver borrowed from . 
customs funds . Besides issuing bank notes and acting as fiscal 
agent for the Go.vernme.nt, the Bank was allowed to deal with 
general banking business. 'Vhen the Revoluti.onar.y .Na.tional Army 
started the Northern Punitive Expedition in 1926, its head 
office was moved to Hanko.w.. .Due to the heavy mi.li tary .exp.endi-.. 
tures, the .tremendous i.ssue of. ita no.tes became valueless .. papen 
The Bank .was finally liquidat.ed .. i.n .1928, . bu.t .the Canton 
insti tution .·was .reorgani.z.ed 1.n .1929 as a pro.vincial gove.rnmen t 
insti tut.ion., . 
The Central Bank of China 
The Central Bank of China was inaugurated in November 1928 
in Shanghai .with a ca.pital of $20 million . A special charter 
was granted as a .sta.te institution consisting of two depart-
ments , banking and issue. In addition to the central banking 
activities , the .Bank was authorized to transact general banking 
business • . On account of its rapid expansion, its capi.tal was 
raised to $ 100 million in May 1934. In May 1935, a new chart.er 
was gran.ted and the organizat.ion of the Bank was .expanded into 
six departments, . . namely, banking, issue., t .reasury , .auditing, 
secretarial and .e.conomic research. .Although the Bank was 
authorized by . the new law to is.sue notes, to act as fis cal 
agents of the National Government .and of all state enterprises, 
as the Treasury's agent in the flotation of loans and as a 
6 
I 
clearing house fer other banks , these funct i ons were never 
'I 
adequately fulfilled during this period owing to the fact that I 
some privileges were tradi t i onally divided with other banks. 
More efforts were to be. mad e in l ater years .to promote this 
Bank as a bankers ' bank. 
The Bank of Ch i na 
The Revolution of 1911 resulted in the breakdown of Ta 
Ching Bank owing to the close politica l connections with the 
Government. The Bank wa s reorganized as the Bank of China 
in 1 912 with an authorized capital of $60 million, but the 
granting of charter wns not until April .1 91 3 b ecause of · 
diff i culty in raising capital. The Bank was granted special 
privileges of is~uing notes and of acting as fiscal agent of 
the Na tional Treasury . In 1916 its Shanghai branch disregards. 
the Bank Moratorium Order issue.d by Yuan Shih-Ka.i G.overnment 
and continued the redemption of banknotes to satisfy the 
demands of the run; thus the Bank .ga ined great confidence with 
the public . 
The revision of the Bank 's chart a~ in 1 917 celled for a 
shift from government to commercial banking. In 1928 t -he Bank 
was designated for the forei gn exchange operations and the 
development of foreign trade. The head office of the Bank was 
moved from Peping to Sha nghai in the same year . With the 
reorganization of the Bank in 1935 i t s .capital was fixed at 
.. A O million . 
7 
The Bank o.f Communications 
The Bank og Communications. was es.tablished in 19.07 on _ . .. 
partnership. bas.is. with .a capital of 10 million t.aels. In .1914 
a new charter was granted .with .the right s of keeping s.pecia.l 
funds of the National Treasury, of .. ac.ting as an agent. for .the . 
flotation of. Government bonds and of issuing hanknotes.. The 
Bank was reorganized in ~928 .and .w.a.s designated . .as an .indus..tri-
al bank .. devo.ted .. to the. purpo.a-e of .:f.o.s.ter.ing and developing .. the .. 
industries and .. trade. of. the. whole .country. In 1935 the regula-
tions of .the Bank were rev.iae.d and its capital was increased 
to :~20 million • .. 
The Bank of Communications evidently failed to develop 
along t he lines of an lndustrial bank. The slow progress of 
industries and the lack of a securlty market confined it.s 
operation to the financing of existing commercial and industri-
al enterprises and of the Government. 
The Farmers Bank of China 
For the .purpos.e of rural. reconstructio.n in the anti-. . .. 
communist campaign; the Four Agriculture Bank .or the Agricul-
tural Bank of Hunan , . Hupeh , Anwhei and Kiangai was .estahlished 
in 1933 with .a ca.pit a.l of ;,•250,000 . .. The .Bank was reorganized 
under the name. or .the Farmers Bank o.f China .in June 1935 . .. Its 
capital was fixed at ~10 million • . The charter of t he Bank 
granted the rights of note issue and the handling of agricul-
tural loans .to farmers. 
8 
The Central Trust or China 
The Central Trust of China was established in Shanghai in 
1935 with a capitol of ',. 50 million. Its inauguration, together 
with the opening of the Sha nghai Development and Trust Company 
by the Municipality of Greater Shanghai in 19~2 , marked the 
beginning of government.-owned .trust companies in China. 
The chief activities of the Central Trust include the 
handling of deposits and savings, underwriting of insurance, 
selling and purchasing of commodities for .the Government and 
collecting product to fulfill barter agreements . 
The Postal Savings and Remittances Bank 
The Postal Savings and Remittances Bank was established 
as . the banking department of the Chinese Post Office in 1919 . 
In 1930 it was detached from the Post Off ice and reorganized 
as an autonomous agency under the direct supervision of the 
Ministry of Communications.. In 1 934 it was reorganized as an 
independent unit. Since then the Bank commenced to ex.ercise 
full control of Pos tal remittances and savings . It began 
writing life insurance policies in Shanghai, Nanklng and Ha nkow 
in 1 9~5 . 
THE LOCAL BANKING SYSTF.M 
Before the Hevolution of 1911 , some provincial banks were 
organized ~long modern lines with ~apital ranging from 1 to 5 
million taels. The mushroom sprang up rapidly after 1911 . 
I 
I 
I .9 
' 
110 
They were established for the purpose of handling local fiscal 
administration. Usually they were the result of a transfer-
mation of t he currency, or note issue, or minting bureaus or 
I 
I 
the provincial treasuries. I 
During the chaotic years following 191.6, provincial banks I 
came under the domination of w.arlor.ds . .They used. them to is.sue 
paper notes to finance their armies; the ba cking of the notes 
was noth:J.ne more than .the force of the armies . The most 
notorious example were the Fukien Bank (opening in 191.2, closed 
in 1922, reopened t.emporarlly in 1926-27), the Szechwan Provin-
cia l Bank (opened for a few months in 192'7), the Ch:thli Provin-
cial Bank (opened in 1903 , closed i n 1927), the Shansi Provin- ' 
cial Bank (opened in 1919), the Honan Provincial Bank (opened 
in 1923 , suspended in 1924, then closed }, the Shantung Bank 
(opened in 1925) and the Fu '11ien Bank or Yunnan .(opened in 
1 
1925, reorganized in .1929). It wa.s r eported that .23 pro.vincial 
banks had been established before 1927, but .20 of. them were 
2 
e1ther closed or r eorganized a fterwards. In revie.·~y ing this 
situation .during 192?, E. Kann wrote that '! a ll the provinces 
in China, with the possible exception of Ki a ngsu and Chekiang, 
are sri:ffering in a s1mila.r way , being saddled with paper money 
for which there is no metallic res erve and for t he redemption 
1 . 1 ~u , Cheng- Hsi , Chinese Modern Banks, . l934 , p .l08-139 ; 
Tamagna , F . M., Banking and Finance in China , 1 942 , p . 40 . 
2. Meng , Hsien- Chang , On Chinese Public Enterprises , New 
China, January 1, 1948 , p .l7. 
1 
of which no one. seems to assume H .abil1t.y. 11 • 
In 1928-1935, 16 mor.e provincial. banks .were established, 
but very few of them could play the role in develop ing 
r e sources in the province , . in exploiting special provincial 
·products and in assisting t he development of local finance. 
The municipal banks were of minor importance in the local 
banking group. The .chief .business of these banks cons i sted of 
handlin g municipal receipts and exp enditures and their 
principa l resources co.nsisted of public funds. Some. of .them 
issued limited amounts o_f . bank notes ma inly.. in subsid ia.ry 
currency.- In l936 .t here were ?municipal b anks; all were 
established a.fter 1927 .•.. 
PH IVATE BANKING SYSTEM 
il 
I 
Al though many private banks had be.en organized after 1911, 1 
most of them emerged ~urlng t he years following World War I . 
From HH8 to 1922, 95 ba nks. were e.stablished; most of them were 
private banks. T.he causes. of t h e prosperity of banking during 
this period will be explained in following sections •. 
Among the modern banks , some well-organized banks opened 
for business, namely, Hs in Hua Trust and Savings Bank (.Shang.-
hai, 1914), Shanghai Commercial and .Savings .Bank (Shanghai ., 
1 91 5 ), Yien Yeh Commercial .Bank (Tientsin, 1915), Young 
Brothers Banking Corporation (_Chungking , 1 916), Kingcheng 
. 1. Kann, E., Revi.ew of the, Bullion and Exchange Marke t in 
1 927, Chinese Economic Journal, March 1928, p .273 - 305 . 
Banking Corporat.i.on . (Tientsin, .191. 7), Continental Bank (.Tien-, 
tsin, 191.9 .}., National Indus.trial Bank of China (Shanghai, 1919 )I 
and South Sea .. Bank (Shanghai, 19.21). - I 
At the beginning. .of the. de.velopment 1 modern Chinese banks 
were organized on the pattern of Japanese banking system wi th 
the view of developing .vari.ous trades and industries in the 
country. Their special i zati.on can be identified by the. titles, 1 
such as Agricultura.l and .Industrial Bank o:r China, National 
Industrial Bank of China, Yien Yeh (salt industry) Commercial 
Bank , Hsin Hua Trust a.nd Sa vings Bank , etc. But they fai.led 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
to develop along their lines and eventually all engaged in the ~~ 
commercia l banking busine.ss. Their head offices gradually 
concentrated in large cities, e specially .Shanghai and Tientsin. 
The rate of expansion of all commercial banks between 19321 
and 1935 was less fast . . than that of the Government and other 
official banks. Before 1935, the .c.ommerc1a.l banks enjoyed the 
privilege of banknote issue and the handsome profit.s from the 
investment of Government securi ties and other specula tive 
activities. 
RELATION .WITH GOVERNMENT 
I 
In reviewing the modern banks and the finance of Gov.ern- I 
ment , L. G. Ting stated that -"the development o.f mo.dern banking! 
in China is chara cterized by the close relationship between the I 
Chinese modern banks and . the Government, especially in 
connection with . uhe 1"lotati.an of Government bonds and treasury 
1 
notes''. From hif! study 1 he revealed a. remarkable relationship 
between the issue of internal loans and t he establis.hment .o£ 
new banks. 
Issue of .Internal Loans .and .the Establishment 
2 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1 91 5 
1916 
1917 
1-918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
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5,000,000 
5,200,000 
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The correlation betw:e.en the two is. apparent, but there 
appears to be a general l ag of a few years in the number of 
new banks established . In .f .act , many of the Chinese banks were 
especially established to handle Government bond issues. 
I 
I 
1. Ting , Lionard G., Chinese Modern Banks and the 
of Government and Industry', Nanka·rt Social and Economic 
ly, October 1935, p.58.4. 
Finance 1 
Quart.er- i 
2. Ibid., p . 585 . I 
According to Kann , 27 loans . .were issued by the Peking 
Government b etwee.n 1913 and 1926 amounting to · a total value of 
$ 632 ,109 , 588 and 28.- loans. wer.e issued by the Nanking _ Government~~ 
between 1 927 and 1935 amounting to a total value of $ 1,42.4,000, ! 
000~ Th e bond prices wer.e as low as 20 per. cent .of the f.ace II 
2
and- t h e issues a.f the National II value during the Peking r .egi.me _ 
Government were mostly sold at 50-60 per .. . cent of the. face .value 
3 
(sometimes as low as 30-40 .per. . . c .ent ). F.or . .exampl.e , . betwe.Gn 
1927 and 1.931, Government .bonds issued t..o. the value .or 
't~'l,006 1 000, .00.0, but ... the net receip~s .appeared in the reports 
d "" . of Minister of Finance to tale only. -;:,.538 , 700,717 or 53 .per. cent 
. . 4 
of the face value of the bonds .floated~ The market price of 
bonds naturally varied at .a.ny time w:lt~ conditions in the money 
market, the amount of bonds in cir.cula tion a.nd the credit 
standing of the Government . 
The normal interest rate for most of issues was a s h igh as 
6 ... 8 per cent per . annum, but because of the great dif.fe r.enc.e 
between race value and market prlce, the actual rate was at 
least twice as much. 
G·overnment bonds use.d to be floate.d through or. advanced 
by banks, especially .by the Bank of China .and .the Banko.!' 
Communications. It w.as estimated .that .about 50 per . cent o~ 
1. China Year~ Book, 1934, p . 552 .• 
2. Ibid., p . 552. 
3 . Chu, Hsieh, Problems of China's Public Financ;e , 1940,. 
p.231-233. 
4. !bid., P - 231-232. i 
j 
1 
Government bonds were beld .. b¥ the mo.dern banks . According to 
I the r eports of the Bank .of China on .28 princ.ipal banks, t he 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'I 
'I 
II 
r a tios of investment in Gover nment securities to the total 
a s sets ranged f r om 5 . 39 to 9 . 5? per cent and to the loans, 
advances and investments ranged f rom ? . 81 to 13 . 53 per cent 
2 
during 1921- 1932. Although the f i gures are not so s t r iking , 
the increasing tendency and the amount of transac tions which 
was several times as great are s ignlfi. cant . 
Other Government obligations due to the Chinese banks were 
loans and advanc es in the f orms of inadequat ely secured .loans 
and overdrafts . One writer declared that ~from 16 to 30 per 
cent of the total re ceipts. during the fiscal. y ears. f rom 1929 t o 
1934 were . .suppl ied .thr;ough .borrowing and for the fiscal years 
ending June 30th ; 1930 , 1 931 and 1 9 32 , proc.eeds from bank loans 
and overdrafts constituted but 10,; 11 a nd 4 per cent of the 
total borrowi.ngs respeottvely , but duri ng the fiscal years 
1929 , 1933 and 1934 , they accounted for 68, 76 and 50 per cent 
3 
respect i vely of the total proceeds .from .borrowings . The 
interest rate ware 1. 6-1 . 8 per cent per mense on loans and 0 . 7 
per cent on advances . I 
As resu1 t of increasing Government expenditures caused by 1 
successive civil wars , more than 85 per cent of the l oans have I 
been used for military .purposes which had nothing to do with 
pal 
' 
1 . Wu , op . cit ., p . ?l- 74 . 
2 . Bank of China , Analysis of the Accounts 
Chinese Banks ,_ 1921-1931 , 1933 , p . 1 . 
3 . Ting , op . cit ., p . 593 . 
of the Prin c i -
I' 
I 
I: 
'I 
1 
t he development of the na t ional economy . 
Banks investment in Goverruilent bonds and treasury no tes 
was very profitable indeed. In addition to the unusually high 
yields , Dovernment securities held by banks could serve as 
reserves aga inst note issue.s . Although tho da ta. ls incomplete, :, 
the following figures on the amount of Government loan 1 
I 
obligations outstanding and those assets of the banks show the 
. 1 picture of their relationship. 
II 
II 
I' I 
lj 
Outstandlng Domestic Loans and the Security Inves tment 
apd Reserves against Note I~sues of. Princ ipal 
Chinese Banks 
(in mi llion dollars) 
The Pr1ncipal Res erve against 
Amount of Do- Investment He serve against Note Issued 
mestic Loa.ns in Securi- Notes in Cir- for Account of 
Outstanding ties of 28 culation or 28 Other Banks of 
at the end or Banks Banks 28 Banks 
1921 ~2::S4 ~ 54 !~, 96 ~ 6 
1922 277 56 115 6 
1923 262 50 140 7 
1924 250 60 151 12 
1925 252 65 205 14 
1926 241 90 229 15 
1927 001 104 262 14 
1928 357 126 309 19 
1929 508 142 250 2, 
1930 625 222 413 30 
1931 926 239 393 35 
1932 774 239 4.30 39 
. 1 From the iocali ty of Chines.e banks , their close re1a tlon 
wi th Government is also apparent. One writer. stated that "in 
I 
I 
1 1925, out of 141 banks 20 were located in Peking, then the 
/ capital or China, and 14 in Tientsin , a large co:rr.mercial center il 
I! 
1. Chien , Chia-Chu , The Domestic Loans of China, 1939,p. 471 
2 . Ting, . op . cit ., p . 595 . 
----
near Peking ; l.n 1934 , as a. result of the removal of' the capital ll 
to Nanking , out of 170 b a nks .only 2 were located i n Pekin· and 
10 in Tients in, while 59. were centered .in Shanghai, t he largeatll 
commercial and industrial .c e.n t .er nanr the pl'esent capital ": ~~ 
THE ROLE IN .THE F.I NANCE OF INDUSTRY I 
Modern indus tries in China haVf3 been l a tely developed with 
slow progress . In their stage of infancy , t hey have been 
hampered by interna l disturbe.nces and for eign competition on 
the one hand and inadequate capita l ization and finance on the. 
I other . 
I 
Industrial .:. irms in Ch lna may- be clas s:i.fied into three 
I 
II 
II 
I 
groups: (1) subsidiari es of compa nies established nbroad; (2) 
l ocal independent enterprises, ovrne C. or .contr .olled by f oreign-
ers and ( 3 ) Chinese enterpris e s~ . The . former t wo. groups were 
II e.dequately support ed by foreign .banks in China , but t he Chinese1 
II 
! enterpris es found diffi culties in raising capital as well a s 
I I :i.n f'tnanc ::tng . The suppl y of ca.pi tal through loE>.ns Ol"' deposi.ts 1 
I 
from friends and acquaintances of a busines s f l rm was quite 
popular. Because of t he la cking of the investment habits of 
II 
II 
I 
I 
II 
I 
II 
the people and t he lacking of the investment market i n the 
country , a l a. r ge number of Chinese industries were under-
capitalized . The requirement of funds from banks for working 
capital or for a part o.f flxed capital appeared necessary. . 
1. Wu, Lionard T. K., China 's Parado.x-.- Prosperous Banks in 
Na t ional Crisis, Far East ern Survey , March 27 , 1 935, p . 43 . 
The amount of industrial loans that could be .obtained 
from banks was ve ry limited . . Bes i des , a .l arge .port.ion of' 
industrial loans was concen t rated in two leading industries--
the cotton and f l our mills .. F.r.om the e.nnual reports of' .two 
leadi ng Chinese banks , the Bank of China and t he S:!:langhai 
Connn''lrc ial and Savings Bank , more than 70 per cent of their 
indus trial l oans lilere extended to the two industries . 
I ndustrial loans used to be made on the basi s of s e cur ity , 
such as deposi t of commodities in godowns and mortgages of 
plant . The l £t37J report of t he Shanghai ommercia l and Sav in s 
Bank , for ins tance , commented that about 60 per cent of its. 
loans to industry was secured on commodities and ;s per cent 
was secured on f a ctor y land nnd buildings . 
The loan policy of. modor:n banks. aimed to foll ow the 
11 or> t hod.o.x 11 theor,{ in .financ ing indu stry, i. e . , to supply short-
term loans for seasonal .needs only . But the practices of 
suppl ying 'tar•m loans 11 were not unusual . Many industrial 
<; oncerns cou l d not cles.r t beir bank indeb t edness perlodically 
and the bank had to cont inue a c ting virtually a s a supplier of 
a par t of the permanent capital of the enterprises . At times 
they wer e even compelled t o grant a ddi tional a ccommoda t ions , 
in t heir a ttempt to save the concerns from financ ial ru·n . 
The effect made banks parti c ipa t ing in the management· of 
industr lal ft rms ne ces ss ry . Instances or the bank s control ling 
borro ting firms by appointing a ccountants . .and engine.ers :w.er e 
net uncom:l!1on . The relat.ions o.f t he Bank of China vi th the. Shen j 
il-19 
Hs in Cot .t on Mi l l in Sha.nehai , wi th the. Foochow Electr .ic Company ~~ 
in Foocho 'I .and wiht the Hangchow .Electr.ic Company in .Hangchow 
were t he. distinct exaJ.nple s . 
Interest char.ges c onstituted an Jmportant i tern in the cost 
of produc.tion in Chines A ln~ustry . .The study. of .C •. " \.; 0 . 
the c ost of produc tion in Chinese cotton mill s r ev eals 
interest rate ranged from .6 to 20 per c ent per annum . 
~ ·ang on il 
that .the :l 
Interos t lj 
char ge amoun ted to $10. 52 per. bale. of 16- .count yarn , as com ... 
1 
par ed with $11 . 03 for direct labor and $ 7 . 79 for power . The 
h i gh intere st rate has great l y nar r owed the possible lr'.arg in of 
profit . 
'i'he reason for hlgh r ate of int erest demanded by banks wa s 
t he result of t wo f acts: (1) the bank r esources wer e mainl 
formed by cur r en t deposit end the payment of interest on 
cur rent account was between 2 t .o <1 per .cent per annum an d t hat 
2 
on fixed acc ount was be.tween 8 to 9 per. c ent per .annum and { 2 ) 
a large por.t i on of hanks ' loanable funds. had be.en drained .into 
the high y ield Governme.nt se.curi ti.es . Therefore , the rate oi~ 
i n terest kept s o high--higher than the industry could afford . 
071-iER B NKING ACTIVI'T.'TES 
In addtion t .o the relation t o Gover nment f i nance and the 
fi nance . of industry , there were other activities .o f moder n 
I 1 . \"Je n g , Ch eng - Chun g , Cost of Production in Chi n e s e C.o.t t .on
1
, 
Mi l ls in Sev en Prov i nces, Quar terl y Review of .Social Sc i en c es , 
March 1935, p .65-110. 
2. 'T'amagna , op . c it ., . p .l 3~? ; Wu , G. H •. , op . cit ., p . 60 . 
Chinese banks worth mentioning. These include the financing of 
I 
rural ec.onomy, the financi.ng o.f trade and the .financi.ng of real i 
estate and speculati-on. 
The Financing of Rural Economy 
The rural people constitute more than 70 .per. cent of the. 
population in China. This i n dica tes the i mportanc.e. of her. 
rural economy . Since the end of World War I, ste.ady det.erior.a- 1 
tion of rural economy cause.d by w:idesprea.d famines .from 
droughts and .floods led the hand--to-mouth peasants badly into 
1 debt. According to the i nvestigation made ~n four provinces of 
central China for the pe.riod 1933- 35 , 70 per cent of farm 
1 
credit went into consumption . As the banks granted loans only 
for productive purposes , which should be secured by agricultur-
al commodities, the inability of farmers to provide the kind of 
security r equired made them incapable of contact . On the o.ther 
hand, the outflow of funds from rural districts to the coastal 
cities during 1931 to 1936 put the difficult situation into. 
stringency. 
II 
I 
Rates of interest of farmers' credit. varied from 30 t .o 100 
per cent p .er annum. The. Bank of China. had pr.ovided a gricul tur- 1 
al loans since 1933 and. attempted to reduce the interest rate 
levels to 20 to 30 per cent p.er annum. However, the .Bank 
furnished only short-term credit which had nothing to do with 
1. Nan, Ping - Jt,ang, A Practtcal S t;Jdy of Rural Credit in 
Four Provinces of Central Chi.na, 1936. 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'I 
I 
I 
.. _ 121 
I 
the permanent rural i mpr ov.ements • . The reorganization of the 
Four Provinces Agricultural Bank into 
took over t he role of financing rural 
I 
jl 
I 
the Farmers Bank of China i 
e c onomy. Very few o.ther 
banks participated in the act i vity of granting fa r m l oans. 
The Financ.lng o.f Trade 
I 
I 
Owing to the fact that .Chinese fo.re.ign trade was dominated ! 
by forei gn .capital, the financing . of .foreign .trade was in the 
hands of foreign banks in China . From traditional reL tion-
ship , native banks retained their specialization ~n the 
financing of domestic tra.de . They. grant.ed loa ns to the local 
merchants on unsecured basls and acted as intermediaries 
between. the Chinese me.rchan ts and foreign banks . Modern banks , 
because of t heir cred1t .po1icy , were limited to the financing 
of wholesale trade . .The .decline of native banks in .t he late II 
II 
I twenties left the situation of retail trade without adequate 
financing agencies . 
The Financing. of Real Est.ate and .Speculation 
The investment in real estate constituted a very common 
form of specul.a. tion in b.anks in China.. In large. c ities, 
especially in .Shanghai ; . the value of .real estate had risen 
rapidly . Between 1903 and 1933 the value o.f land had risen 
1 
from 606 to 973 per cent in different .distri c ts of Shanghai . 
The exact part played by t he banks remalned obs cure , but it 
1 • Wu , C • H. ; op . c 1 t • , p • 82 . 
I 
I, 
I 
I 
I 
" 
was undoubtedly .large in the various types of constitutions , 
native , foreign and modern . The real .estate boom subsided in 
the years preeeeding the Sino-Japanese .1Var and s.ome banks .were 
for c ed into bankr.uptcy because of the. speculati.on . 
Other forms of speculation we.re known as foreign exel'l.-ange 
and bullion speculation, mostly ca.rried on by forei.gn banks in 
Shanghai t commodity speculation, which was especi.ally pursued 
by native banks .and Government security speculation, whi.ch wa s 
mainly played by the modern banks .. 
